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RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 2710  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5180  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 4707  
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2797  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 2169  
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1961  
RUEAAIA/CIA WASHDC  
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUEKJCS/Joint STAFF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 001286

SIPDIS

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SUBJECT: POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S POSSIBLE MEETING WITH  
PRESIDENT YUDHOYONO

Classified By: Ambassador Cameron R. Hume, reasons 1.4(b+d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Mission understands that President Bush may have a short meeting with Indonesian President Yudhoyono on the margins of the upcoming G-8 Summit. We recommend that the President raise the troubled state of health cooperation as the most pressing issue to advance our bilateral relationship. U.S.-Indonesian cooperation on sample sharing, particularly avian and seasonal influenza, benefits both countries and the international community. If President Yudhoyono raises security cooperation, we recommend underscoring the U.S. commitment to advance cooperation, including finding ways to engage the Indonesian Army Special Forces (Kopassus). END SUMMARY.

#### BILATERAL HEALTH COOPERATION THREATENED

¶2. (C) The U.S. and the international community are concerned about Indonesia's steady withdrawal from established global health security institutions and processes. The Indonesian government refuses to share disease samples with the global scientific community, threatening scientific cooperation that could prevent a global influenza pandemic. Available data suggest that most influenza-related deaths are caused by seasonal strains that originate in Southeast Asia. Indonesian Minister of Health Supari is not sharing any influenza strains--either seasonal or avian influenza--with the World Health Organization and is limiting more and more Indonesian scientific and health collaboration. Refusing to share seasonal influenza samples increases the likelihood of more seasonal flu deaths in the U.S. (now at 40,000 annually) due to less comprehensive flu vaccines. Indonesia has the highest number of avian influenza cases (135) and fatalities (110) in the world. Indonesian laboratories do not have capacity to adequately monitor changes in avian influenza strains nor to assess risk for possible pandemics. The U.S. and international partners want to help Indonesia prevent a possible global pandemic, but the Indonesian government needs to cooperate.

¶3. (C) One bilateral element of this problem concerns the U.S. Naval Area Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-2) in Indonesia. The Health Minister has repeatedly called for NAMRU-2's closure and questioned the official status of NAMRU-2's U.S. government staff. The behavior of the Health Minister is

damaging the broader bilateral relationship and President Yudhoyono has made little effort to reign her in. NAMRU-2 is a premier scientific organization that benefits both Indonesia and the U.S. The Minister's attacks have undercut nearly completed negotiations for a new Memorandum of Understanding for NAMRU-2's continued operation in Indonesia.

The official status of NAMRU-2's U.S. government officials is a major sticking point and source of confusion. The U.S. requests continued administrative and technical status (A&T) status, the same status that USAID employees and many others at our Embassy have. Without A&T status, NAMRU-2 cannot remain in Indonesia.

¶4. (SBU) We suggest two talking points on our health cooperation:

-- Indonesia has a moral and UN treaty obligation to monitor and report infectious disease cases and to collaborate with the global health community in developing effective vaccines against infectious diseases. Indonesia's refusal to share samples endangers global health and increases the chances of a pandemic from untested Indonesian strains. It is essential that Indonesia resume cooperation with the WHO and other international health security institutions.

-- NAMRU-2 benefits Indonesia and the United States. We want NAMRU-2 to remain, and we want to work with Indonesia in fighting disease, but we can do so only if Indonesia is willing to collaborate on a professional basis. Our U.S. staff do not need diplomatic status, but they must have administrative and technical staff status. Nowhere in the

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world does the United States allow U.S. government employees to work with less.

#### SECURITY COOPERATION

¶5. (C) Since Secretary's Rice's lifting of legislative sanctions against Indonesia in November 2005, U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military cooperation has progressed steadily. Indonesia has also played a constructive role in UN-sponsored international peacekeeping, particularly its 850 troops in Lebanon with UNIFIL, in which the president's son has participated. Since Suharto stepped down a decade ago, the Indonesian military has made transformational changes, many under Yudhoyono's leadership when he was still in the military.

¶6. (C) Accountability for past human rights violations remains a concern, particularly in the U.S. Congress. Criticism of Indonesian military, particularly on human rights, focuses on the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus). Kopassus is the sole force that remains excluded from our now broad bilateral engagement with the Indonesian military. In the past, this elite force committed human rights violations, but since 2004 it has made firm commitments to reform. Kopassus now receives regular human-rights training from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

¶7. (C) The special military forces play an essential role in Indonesia's ability to protect U.S. interests in Indonesia. Kopassus and their police counterparts protect the U.S. Embassy and Indonesian sites in the event of terrorist attack, hostage-taking, aircraft hijacking, and violent demonstrations. Not engaging Kopassus neglects fundamental security interests of the U.S. in Indonesia. Indonesia resents that the United States will not engage with Kopassus. This resentment is damaging overall bilateral cooperation.

¶8. (SBU) It is possible that President Yudhoyono will mention security cooperation, particularly Kopassus. IF ASKED, we suggest:

-- We support full re-engagement with Indonesian military forces, including Kopassus. Such re-engagement builds on our

conversation in Sydney and the U.S. decision in 2005 to lift sanctions and to rebuild the bilateral security partnership. Although U.S. Congressional concerns regarding human rights abuses in the past continue to restrict our ability to engage with Kopassus, we are actively seeking to find ways in which Congress can support that engagement. Security cooperation and human rights promotion are two mutually reinforcing goals in U.S.-Indonesian relations.

-- The Indonesia-Timor-Leste Commission on Truth and Friendship (CTF) is an important opportunity to demonstrate Indonesia's commitment to accountability on human rights. This is a major step in supporting human rights and we urge the Indonesian government to implement its recommendations.

HUME